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The new generation of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models 
seems particularly suited for conducting scenario analysis. These models 
formalise the behaviour of economic agents on the basis of explicit micro-
foundations. As a result, they appear less prone to the Lucas critique than 
traditional macroeconometric models. DSGE models provide researchers with 
powerful tools, which allow for the design of a broad range of scenarios and can 
tackle a large range of issues, while at the same time offering an appealing 
structural interpretation of the scenario specification and simulation results. This 
paper provides illustrations of some of the modelling issues that often arise when 
implementing scenarios using DSGE models in the context of projection exercises 
or policy analysis. These issues reflect the sensitivity of DSGE model-based 
analysis to scenario assumptions, which in more traditional models are 
apparently less critical, such as, for example, scenario event anticipation and 
duration, as well as treatment of monetary and fiscal policy rules. 
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The new generation of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models seems 
particularly suited for conducting scenario analysis. These models formalise the 
behaviour of economic agents on the basis of explicit micro-foundations allowing for a 
distinction between intrinsic dynamics and dynamics arising from rational expectations. 
As a result, DSGE models appear less prone to the Lucas critique (Lucas, 1976) than 
traditional macroeconomic models. Yet, the use of DSGE models for scenario analysis 
requires making a number of choices. Scenarios can be implemented by specifying paths 
for a selected set of observed variables, by setting values for a subset of structural shocks 
or by changing certain parameter values. Moreover, the scenario event may be anticipated 
or unanticipated by economic agents. A choice of particular importance concerns the 
assumption regarding the reactions of interest and exchange rates, as economic agents’ 
expectations about the future conduct of monetary policy shape the outcome of model-
based simulations in important ways.  
Practical experience of using modern DSGE models for scenario analysis in 
policymaking institutions is relatively limited and diverse across individual institutions. 
In the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) DSGE model-based analysis received 
large impetus as estimated DSGE models were put into use for the production of 
macroeconomic projections in a number of central banks. Indeed, within the ESCB there 
is growing evidence of a wider usage of DSGE models in preparing projections and 
conducting policy analysis. Scenario topics and areas of application of DSGE models are 
very diverse ranging from the assessment of uncertainty around the baseline projection to 
ad-hoc policy analysis, evaluation of structural reforms, and inputs into financial stability 
analysis. Still, the adoption of the DSGE approach to scenario analysis is, in many 
respects, an ongoing process and there is much to be learned about the design, 
implementation and communication of DSGE model-based scenario analysis. 
Consequently, the documentation on the practical implementation of these models in 
scenario analysis remains relatively scarce.  
Against this background, this study aims at fostering the discussion of the use of 
DSGE models for scenario analysis. To this end, the study examines a number of 
conceptual issues related to the implementation of scenarios with DSGE models and 
presents model-based simulations aimed at illustrating these issues under alternative 
assumptions. A comparison of scenario implementation using DSGE and traditional 
models was conducted when deemed feasible. Besides fulfilling the above-mentioned 
objectives, this study serves to familiarise the readers with the feasibility of conducting 
various scenarios using DSGE models, discussing both advantages and limitations of 
such scenario analysis.  
Section 2 presents an overview of conceptual issues relevant to DSGE model-based 
scenario implementation. Section 3 provides some selective illustrations of using DSGE 
models for scenario analysis. The focus here is on simple scenarios, which help to 
highlight implications of particular choices when designing scenarios using DSGE 
models. Firstly, we discuss implications of the assumption about shock anticipation by 
economic agents for the overall assessment of model reaction. Secondly, we investigate 
the importance of alternative treatment of interest and exchange rates for the transmission 
  2of economic shocks. Finally, we discuss issues related to the implementation of fiscal 
policy scenarios in DSGE models and offer some recommendations. In particular, we 
focus on implications of alternative assumptions regarding shock duration, the choice of 
fiscal instruments in specifying the fiscal policy rule, alternative treatments of monetary 
policy and implications of international policy coordination. The concluding part 
summarises the study. 
  
  31.  Scenarios in DSGE models 
 
This section provides an overview of conceptual issues for implementing scenarios in 
DSGE models, identifies key choices in designing scenarios and briefly discusses key 
differences of scenario implementation in DSGE and traditional macroeconometric 
models. 
 
2.1.  Scenario implementation in DSGE models: Conceptual issues 
 
DSGE models offer the possibility of conducting counterfactual scenarios in order to 
assess the effects of events on the endogenous variables. The essential concept in this 
respect is a structural shock. Therefore, in what follows we start with a concise overview 
of the different types of structural shocks used in DSGE models, and then continue 
discussing how to conduct different types of counterfactual scenarios. We conclude the 
subsection by describing how economic policies are represented in a typical DSGE 
model.  
 
2.1.1.  Structural shocks  
 
Structural shocks are the ultimate source of fluctuations in DSGE models. They are 
structural in the sense that they are orthogonal to each other and have an economic 
interpretation. Structural shocks are usually modelled as an autoregressive process of 
order one, which is exogenous to the remainder of the model: 
1 (1 ) tt ee e t ρ ρε − = +− +, 
where   is the structural shock,  t e ρ  is the autoregressive parameter capturing the shock 
persistence,  e is the steady-state value of the shock and  t ε  is the shock innovation (i.e. 
the unexpected change of the shock process).  
In its log-linearized form, the shock process becomes  1 ˆˆ tt ee t ρ ε − = + , where   
refers to the deviation of the structural shock from its steady-state level. It is noteworthy 
that structural shocks are typically unobserved variables. Their historical values can be 
estimated using the state-space representation of the model. Hence, robustness issues 
(model dependence) apply to empirical estimates of the shocks. 
ˆt e
By definition a shock (innovation to a shock) is always unanticipated
1 and, in their 
stochastic form, DSGE models handle only unexpected changes in shock processes. 
However, one can use the deterministic version of a DSGE model to analyze anticipated 
changes in exogenous processes or parameters. Thus, DSGE models in fact enable 
modellers to distinguish between anticipated and unanticipated  economic events or 
shocks. From a modelling perspective, an unanticipated shock is a situation where an 
economic event is not anticipated or pre-announced. In this common case, economic 
                                                 
1 It should be noted that the term “shock” is used differently in the literature. Generally, a shock 
refers to an unexpected or unpredictable event that affects the economy ( t ε  in our notation). In the 
DSGE literature, the term “shock” is usually used to denote the shock process  , which is driven 
by current and previous innovations, being, therefore, partly predictable. 
t e
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the economy. On the other hand, if the event is anticipated or pre-announced, the agents 
are able to react in advance as soon as the shock is known to them. In this case the 
optimal behaviour is different from the one in case of an unanticipated shock. Details 
regarding the implementation of scenarios based on anticipated events are discussed in 
section 3.1. 
Furthermore, DSGE models allow for the incorporation of both transitory and 
permanent shocks. Transitory shocks follow a stationary autoregressive process that does 
not exhibit a unit root. In other words, the autoregressive coefficient must be strictly 
below unity,  1 < ρ . In this case, endogenous variables react temporarily to such a shock, 
but return back to the steady-state level after some time. This duration is determined by 
the degree of persistence of the shock and by the endogenous propagation mechanisms. 
Permanent shocks follow a unit root process ( 1 = ρ ) implying that after a permanent 
shock the model variables do not return to the previous steady-state levels but converge to 
new steady-state levels. 
As an example, the New Area-Wide Model of the euro area (NAWM
2) includes a 
permanent labour-augmenting technology shock   which shifts labour productivity 
permanently. This shock introduces a unit root process in firms’ output. Since it is 
assumed that the shock is integrated of order one, the growth rate of the shock is 
stationary and evolves according to the following serially correlated process:  
t z
z g
t t z gz z gz t z g g g η ρ ρ + + − = −1 , , ) 1 ( , 
where  gz ρ  is the autoregressive coefficient which is strictly below unity,  is the shock 
innovation and   represents the (gross) rate of labour-augmenting 
productivity growth with steady-state value  .  
z g
t η
1 , / − = t t t z z z g
z g
With a permanent technology shock, the model has to be transformed to achieve 
stationarity. Therefore, all variables sharing the same common real trend are scaled by the 
level of productivity . When conducting a scenario, which incorporates the permanent 
technology shock, the original (non-stationary) variables have to be recovered by 
rescaling the stationarized variables by the level of the permanent technology shock. 
t z
 
2.1.2.  Structural shock scenarios 
 
Counterfactual analysis based on direct manipulation of structural shocks is referred to as 
structural shock scenarios. The most obvious way to conduct a structural shock scenario 
is to set the shock innovation to a non-zero value (usually one standard deviation) in the 
first period and zero afterwards. The structural shock then evolves according to the AR 
(1) process where agents expect the shock innovations to be zero in future periods. This 
approach closely resembles standard impulse-response analysis. 
If the modeller wishes to obtain a given path for a structural shock  , then he has 
to set the shock innovation in each period to 
t e
e e e t t t ) 1 ( 1 ρ ρ ε − − − = − . This allows 
                                                 
2 See  Christoffel  et al. (2008) for a documentation of the specification, estimation and properties 
of the NAWM. 
  5achieving any arbitrary path for the shock process. This approach might, however, not be 
regarded as a fully coherent way to implement such a scenario, since it is not reasonable 
to assume that the economic agents would maintain their expectation of zero future shock 
innovations despite systematic deviations from zero in the past. 
 
2.1.3.  Observed variable scenarios 
 
 Apart from structural shock scenarios, DSGE models can also be used to assess the 
consequences of assuming alternative paths for a subset of observed variables. Such 
exercises are called observed variable scenarios. This allows using DSGE models in 
conditional forecasting exercises, where forecasts of endogenous variables are conditional 
on a predetermined path for some other endogenous variables.  
In order to be able to conduct observed variable scenarios, some (or all) shocks 
have to be adjusted to ensure that the conditioning information is met by the predictions. 
More specifically, the state-space representation of the DSGE model (which describes the 
solution of the forward looking model) is inverted (see Christoffel et al. (2007) for 
details). This gives the values for the subset of the structural shocks in order to keep the 
specified endogenous variables at their desired values over the given horizon. 
The  NAWM is used in the regular projections exercises of the ESCB under the 
following specification for conditioning variables: 
• the nominal interest rate is assumed to follow a predetermined path over the 
projection horizon;  
• the nominal exchange rate is assumed to be fixed at the last observed value over the 
projection horizon; 
• foreign variables and real government consumption are assumed to take on their ex-
post realisations.  
In the first case the monetary policy shock is manipulated to ensure the assumed 
path of the interest rate. In the second case, the external risk premium shock is the one 
that should be manipulated to give us the pre-specified path. In the third case, all foreign 
shocks and the government consumption shock are manipulated. 
Besides manipulating some specific shocks, an observed variable scenario can be 
conducted by manipulating all shocks. In this case one may set the structural shocks such 
that over the scenario horizon the squared distance from some alternative values for the 
shocks is minimized. Alternatively, following the Waggoner and Zha (1999) approach, 
the economic shocks can be drawn from a distribution that ensures that the conditioning 
information (assumption) is met. In this case, the mean of the shocks is selected such that 
on average it satisfies linear restrictions imposed by the conditioning assumption and the 
deviation of the shocks from their mean is orthogonal to the restrictions (Warne, 2008). 
 
2.1.4.  Parameter scenarios 
 
Furthermore, DSGE models can also be used to conduct parameter scenarios. This 
allows investigating the direct impact of a parameter change on endogenous variables and 
the impact of a parameter change on the transmission of structural shocks. Parameter 
scenarios can be categorized according to the degree of anticipation and duration of the 
  6simulated change as well as whether the parameter change alters the steady state of the 
model. 
Firstly, changes in parameters can be unanticipated (e.g. a surprise change of 
preferences) or anticipated (e.g. a pre-announced tax or pension reform). Secondly, 
changes can be permanent (e.g. a permanent tax cut) or transitory (e.g. a temporary tax 
cut). Thirdly, parameter changes might only affect the model dynamics towards the 
steady state (e.g. a change of an adjustment cost parameter) or the steady state itself (e.g. 
a tax cut permanently affecting labour supply and/or capital accumulation, or a change in 
a preference parameter). In the first case one can, for example, compare the smoothed 
shocks for different parameter values and the same observed variables, or construct a 
counterfactual scenario for the observables with the smoothed shocks of one parameter 
vector and the transition function of another vector (Warne, 2008). In the second case, it 
might be interesting to look at the transition from the old steady state to the new one. 
 
2.1.5.  Economic policies in DSGE models  
 
Economic policies in DSGE models are typically described by specifying some 
systematic reactions of policy instruments. These reaction functions are commonly 
referred to as monetary and fiscal policy rules. Compared to more traditional backward-
looking models, policy rules in DSGE models play a more prominent role in model 
simulations, mainly due to the expectations channel. First, due to their forward-looking 
nature, simulating DSGE models (even over a very short horizon) requires long-run 
stability and convergence of the model solution. In this regard, policy rules act as 
essential model closure rules. Second, model responses are heavily dependent on 
operation of policy rules as optimising forward-looking private agents take into account 
expected policy reactions.  
The monetary policy rule is a device used in macro models to mimic the behaviour 
of the monetary policy authority, the central bank. In DSGE models the monetary policy 
rule is crucial to ensure price determinacy ruling out multiple equilibria (see, e.g. Lubik 
and Schorfheide (2004), Woodford (2003), and King (2000)). To fulfil these 
requirements, the monetary policy rule must be credible in the sense that all economic 
agents can anticipate the inflation target and the policy rate path. Usually monetary policy 
rules are specified in terms of systematic adjustment of the short-term interest rates to 
inflation and output gap. Different weights placed on these two variables capture the 
relative importance of inflation versus output stabilization objectives of the monetary 
authority. Additionally, monetary policy rules often feature an autoregressive component 
that accounts for the interest rate smoothening, reflecting the degree of gradualism of 
monetary policy. 
The fiscal rule is a device aimed to mimic the behaviour of the government in 
managing fiscal policy in order to prevent debt from following an unstable path that will 
likely drive general government accounts to an insolvent position. Many DSGE models in 
academia consider balanced budget rules, which entail that the budget is balanced within 
each period. However, this is a very unrealistic assumption implying that governments do 
not maintain a debt stock. Therefore, most models used by policymaking institutions 
include more flexible fiscal rules, which ensure maintenance of a sustainable public debt 
stock and enable management of the fiscal policy through the operation of fiscal 
  7stabilisers and the implementation of fiscal packages. Typically, fiscal rules are specified 
in terms of an endogenous reaction of some tax rate (e.g. the labour income tax rate) to 
deviations of public debt (the debt gap) from its targeted level, (consistent with the debt 
target and the steady-state features of the economy). In some cases an indicator of the 
cyclical position of the economy (e.g. output gap or fiscal revenue gap) is included in the 
fiscal rule as well. The relative size of the parameters essentially reflects the attitude of 
the government towards the debt gap or the cyclical position, allowing for the 
specification of pro-cyclical, countercyclical or structural budget balance rules, depending 
on the concrete parameterisation considered. 
All agents populating DSGE models are assumed to know the policy rules and 
believe that the policymakers will behave in line with such predefined reaction functions. 
Any deviations from the systematic behaviour imposed by monetary and fiscal rules will 
be interpreted as a policy shock, which cannot persist indefinitely without triggering a 
shift in agents’ believe about policy regime (see Leeper and Zha (2003) for discussion on 
modesty of policy interventions). Moreover, because the stability of forward-looking 
DSGE models is very sensitive with respect to the operation of monetary and fiscal policy 
rules, conducting “no policy change” type of scenarios is only feasible over a limited time 
horizon, after which policy rules must be allowed to operate freely. Several practical 
examples illustrating the impact of an alternative treatment of monetary and fiscal policy 
rules are presented in sections 0.3.20.3.2 and 0.3.3.    
  
2.2. Differences of scenario implementation between DSGE and 
traditional models 
 
This subsection briefly discusses the key differences of scenario implementation in 
DSGE models and in traditional macroeconometric (TM) models.
 As a workhorse tool of 
macroeconomic analysis and forecasting employed in the majority of policymaking 
institutions, TM models are the predecessors of the modern DSGE models; hence, some 
brief comparison between the two generations of models is instructive.
3 
In comparison to DSGE models, building TM models typically rests on a partial 
equilibrium approach where individual blocks of a TM model can be specified and 
estimated independently. Therefore, model changes in TM models can be introduced 
more easily. This is in contrast to DSGE models, where even small changes in model 
structure often require re-specification of the entire model starting from the first 
principles. In practice, the apparent flexibility of TM models allows modellers to 
accommodate specific (non-standard) scenario requests relatively easy. This comparative 
advantage of TM models, however, comes at the cost of less stringent theoretical 
foundations.  
                                                 
3 The theoretical foundation of a typical TM model rests on the Neoclassical-Keynesian synthesis 
whereby aggregate supply determines the long run and aggregate demand governs the short-run 
model properties. A significant share of TM model equations follows ad hoc specification 
featuring reduced-form parameters, which are typically estimated applying error-correction 
econometric techniques.   
  8As regards more substantive issues, main differences in scenario implementation 
between TM and DSGE models predominantly stem from treatment of expectations and 
theoretical coherence of model structures (see Table 1 for a summary). 
 
Table 1. Key differences of scenario implementation in TM and DSGE models 
  TM Models  DSGE Models 
Treatment of 
expectations 
Usually backward-looking, but can 
include forward-looking elements  Forward-looking 
Shock anticipation 
Unanticipated (backward-looking 
models) and anticipated (forward-
looking models) 
Unanticipated (default), though 
anticipated shocks are also feasible 
Shock duration 
Temporary/permanent makes no 
difference in backward-looking 
models within the scenario horizon 
Anticipated duration of shock 
matters 
Structural shock 
scenarios  Not feasible 
Explicit manipulation of shock 
innovations to achieve the desired 
path of a structural shock 
Observed variable 
scenarios 
Manipulation of exogenous 
variables or residual adjustment 
Implicit manipulation of shock 
innovations to achieve the desired 
path of a variable 
 
Expectations and the nature of shocks 
The treatment of expectations is a major characteristic of any economic model. DSGE 
models typically consider rational expectations. The latter is a crucial feature in policy 
simulation exercises as explained in Lucas (1976). On the other hand, expectations in TM 
models are usually modelled as adaptive expectations, resulting in backward-looking 
behaviour of the model leaving these models subject to the Lucas critique and implying 
that simulations based on these models are flawed by a mistreatment of the formation of 
expectations. However, some TM models such as the Area-Wide Model (AWM) and 
NiGEM
4 include forward-looking behaviour of some variables, though its theoretical 
consistency can always be questioned due to the lack of explicit micro-foundations. 
Whilst in forward-looking TM models both anticipated and unanticipated shocks can be 
simulated, pure backward-looking models allow for unanticipated shocks only. 
 
Permanent versus transitory shocks  
In purely backward-looking TM models, the solution of the model requires neither 
linearization nor computation of the steady state. These models are typically solved 
recursively in levels. Therefore, within the first t periods there is no difference between 
implementing a permanent shock or a transitory shock of duration t, since in those first t 
periods both types of shocks will have the same effect. Nevertheless, beyond the first t 
periods, those shocks will produce different results. 
Introducing a permanent shock into a DSGE model may require transforming the 
model to achieve stationarity of the non-stationary variables, depending on the solution 
method. After running the simulation, the stationary results have to be transformed back 
to obtain the scenario result. More importantly, the forward-looking nature of DSGE 
                                                 
4  NIGEM (National Institute's Global Econometric Model) is an estimated multi-country model 
developed by the National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR). 
  9models implies that even the model responses in the first period depend on the duration of 
the shock.     
 
Structural shock scenarios 
Since TM models do not include structural shocks (i.e. exogenous stochastic processes 
featuring clear economic interpretation), it is not possible to specify a scenario in terms of 
structural shocks. Instead, it has to be implemented by adjusting the residuals and/or 
exogenous variables. 
 
Observed variable scenarios   
Observed variable scenarios can be implemented in both types of models. In a TM model, 
a desired path for an endogenous variable can be achieved by manipulating exogenous 
variables or by residual adjustment. In the case of residual adjustment, two steps are 
necessary to simulate the effects of a desired path of an endogenous variable
5 on the 
remainder of the model. Firstly, the residuals in the equation of that variable have to be 
determined
6. This can either be done on a trial and error basis or by inverting the model 
(i.e. letting the model compute the set of residuals consistent with that path). Secondly, 
the model has to be simulated with that residual path for the desired variable. The 
response of the rest of the model variables would imply indirect effects on that 
endogenous variable. This can be avoided by dropping that variable (i.e. declaring it as 
exogenous and dropping the respective equation). 
 
                                                 
5 The same procedure can be used in the case of multiple variables. 
6 In equations without residuals (e.g. the GDP definition equation), this procedure becomes 
slightly more complicated, since the modeller has to make decisions about which other 
endogenous variables have to be changed. 
  103.  Practical implementation issues: Some illustrations 
 
This section provides selective model-based simulations illustrating important aspects of 
DSGE implementation in scenario analysis. First, we discuss the implications of event 
anticipation (anticipated vs. unanticipated shocks) on model behaviour. Second, we 
investigate the importance of alternative treatments of short-term interest and exchange 
rates for the transmission of economic shocks. Lastly, we conclude the section discussing 
issues related to the implementation of fiscal policy scenarios using DSGE models. 
 
3.1. Anticipated vs. unanticipated scenario events 
 
The forward-looking nature of DSGE models enables modellers and policymakers to 
distinguish between anticipated and unanticipated events (Wohltmann and Winkler 
(2009), Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2008), and Wouter and Kaltenbrunner (2009)). A 
possibility to introduce nontrivial paths of anticipated events into a structural model 
simulation is crucial for monetary or fiscal policy analysis. In this case all agents 
including policymakers have an opportunity to take into account the future development 
and deal with the future changes with full beliefs. In reality many events can be fully or at 
least partly anticipated (government announcement of a future tax reform, plans of market 
deregulation, firms’ commitments for some actions, etc.). The anticipated nature of future 
changes allows both private agents and policymakers to react in advance. This is 
especially important in an inflation-targeting regime, which is based on forward-looking 
behaviour of monetary policy. In this subsection we demonstrate how expectations of 
future events can be captured within a structural model simulation and how anticipation 
affects the behaviour of economic agents.  
 
3.1.1.  Event anticipation and dynamics of response   
 
In case of anticipated events the simulation horizon can be divided in an “announcement 
phase” until period T (e.g. the period when the anticipated event actually takes place) and 
an “implementation phase” after period T. If the expectations are fulfilled, there is no 
surprise, no new information and no “jump” in economic variables.
7 If the expectations 
are not fulfilled, economic variables jump and the simulation features “boom-bust” 
scenarios. Thus, in principle, the dynamics of the economy can be driven mainly by 
“news”. A simple example illustrating differences of model dynamics following an 
anticipated and unanticipated shock is provided in Appendix A.     
The reaction to an anticipated shock depends on a length of the period between the 
announcement and the realisation of the event or policy change. The longer the time 
horizon is, the higher the adaptability in behaviour of economic a/gents is, implying that 
the reaction to the shock does not suffer from high and frequent changes. Note that the 
reaction of the economy crucially depends on the dynamics, i.e. the rigidities in the 
                                                 
7 In case of an anticipated shock, the smoothness of the reaction of economic variables crucially 
depends on the ability of all agents to revise their plans, thus smoothing the impact of the shock. 
However, this may not occur for all agents. For instance, liquidity-constrained households cannot 
engage in inter-temporal consumption smoothing since they do not hold assets. 
  11economy. The more flexible the economy is, the shorter will be the period of necessary 
adjustment to an announced shock.
8 The simulation results as well as the implementation 
technique are different for anticipated and unanticipated shocks. There are many ways of 
solving models with announcements.
9 They differ mostly in the degree of user input 
needed and computational efficiency.  
In case of unanticipated shocks, one of the procedures can be simply described in 
the following way. Model equations are transformed to the state-space representation 
with the assumption of a zero mean value for all shocks used in the model. After solving 
the model, shocks are added to the system. Indeed, the shocks are unknown until the 
period when they occur.  
On the other hand, using anticipated shocks requires a slight modification of the 
solution approach and understanding of the final form of the solved state-space 
representation. All anticipated shocks are an essential part of the solution of the model. 
One can also incorporate additional state variables extending the state-space form and 
create non-trivial anticipations in all standard solution packages. The anticipated shock is 
dealt as a perfect foresight (belief) of agents. In this case the shock is a part of agents’ 
optimization problems.  
A mixture of anticipated and unanticipated shocks is also possible. It can improve 
the predictive abilities of the model, bring a new dimension to the model framework, and 
offer an economic story closer to prospective economic behaviour. Most importantly, the 
expectation shocks in a particular period may concern a very specific path of a variable – 
e.g. following large revisions in a foreign demand or price assumption. 
A possibility to use anticipated or unanticipated shocks or their combination for 
simulations is, however, connected to some additional issues. For example, all agents in 
most of our models have the same information sets
10. There is no assumption of 
information asymmetry and all agents react immediately when anticipated shocks appear 
(in accordance with the model structure and setting). This can cause problems because in 
reality some agents do not have full information, evaluate information in different 
manners, or simply do not want to react. Yet all these facts pertain to unanticipated 
shocks also. An important phase of model evaluation then becomes an impulse-response 
to anticipated shocks with different horizons of realisation. Therefore, it could be more 
convenient to treat an anticipated change as a single shock or a sequence of unanticipated 
shocks. In case of the combination of anticipated and unanticipated shocks, it may be 
hard to advocate that some shocks should be anticipated and some of them unanticipated. 
As an illustration, Appendix B presents an example of alternative treatment of future 
                                                 
8 Technically, this means that, in contrast to the standard case where the dynamics of the model is 
driven by stable eigenvalues of the model, during the announcement phase the economy is driven 
both by stable and unstable eigenvalues of the system. The agents use the inverse of unstable 
dynamics to “discount” the future shocks. Classical papers by Blanchard and Kahn (1980) or Klein 
(2000) provide a lot of intuition in this respect compared to other solution methods, e.g. 
undetermined coefficients. 
9 For a detailed description of different solution methods see, e.g. Marimon and Scott (1999) or 
Heer and Maußner (2005). 
10 Clearly, government, central bank and public have different information sets and this may affect 
economic dynamics, but solving DSGE models with information heterogeneity is very complex. 
The problem of the information set may be, for example, the anticipation of regulated prices, 
government spending, or the assumption that the central bank can costlessly monitor all 
technology shocks, habit shocks, etc. This is certainly a strong simplification. 
  12change in administered prices and explains why unanticipated shocks might result in 
better and more realistic projection compared with the option of anticipated shock. 
Regarding the use of anticipated shocks it should be further noted, that most of the 
currently built DSGE models are estimated under the assumptions that the structural 
shocks are unanticipated.  Therefore the reliance on anticipated shocks over the forecast 
horizon might not be fully consistent with the estimation methodology. The solution to 
this problem might be a change of the estimation methodology that could reflect the 
assumption of anticipated nature of some variables.
11 On the other hand, scenario 
analysis, compared with the regular projection exercise, provides somewhat more degrees 
of freedom in the treatment of anticipated vs. unanticipated shocks since it might be based 




3.1.2.  Forecasting with anticipated shocks 
 
Using anticipated paths of exogenous shocks is very useful in forecasting exercises if 
these are conditioned on a path of some exogenous variables – e.g. rest of the world 
assumptions, commodity prices, etc. The choice between anticipated and unanticipated 
shocks for capturing exogenous assumptions should be addressed depending on how 
much of the considered information is publicly available, as well as how much it is a part 
of the information set that determines the general public’s expectations. For those central 
banks that transparently reveal their forecast assumptions, the reliance on anticipated 
shocks is one of the natural choices. In general, however, there are no rigidly applicable 
rules for the use of anticipated vs. unanticipated shocks in the current forecasting practice 
of central banks.  
As using anticipated shocks may be useful for conditioning on exogenous 
variables, it is absolutely crucial for conditioning on endogenous variables such as 
interest and/or exchange rates as done by many central banks. Scenarios using 
conditioning with repeated shocks are often communicated as an announced policy – 
which is not the case. If these scenarios are to be treated as “as if” scenarios where all 
agents know that policy authority is conditioning on a particular path of interest rate then 
conditioning using anticipated shocks must be carried out with all the consequences for 
the dynamics of the economy. Note that the reaction of the economy to identical paths of 
interest rates strongly depends on whether it is pre-announced or sequentially 
surprising
12. The rigidities of the model and the distinction between “old Keynesian” and 
                                                 
11 Note also that there are non-trivial econometric consequences of anticipated shocks (Hansen and 
Sargent (1991), and Lippi and Reichlin (1994)). Anticipated shocks may lead to non-fundamental 
representations of the model, where the econometrician has a different (smaller) information set 
than households and firms. This complicates econometric analysis, including structural VAR 
analysis. 
12 Given the forward-looking and “rational” nature of most DSGE models, a protracted period of 
surprising agents may be “immodest” in terms of Leeper and Zha (2003) and at odds with rational 
expectations equilibrium.  
  13“new 
ariable scenarios described 
above
he shock has always the same value for all subsequent 
simula
cenarios with respect to a baseline should be performed using soft tunes 
(without conditioning on any variables) in order to facilitate communication of the 
acroeconomic variables. In this particular scenario exercise we employ a 
SGE model of the Czech National Bank
15. The simulation results are displayed in 
Figure 1.  
Keynesian” theory, including the forward-looking Fisher equation, become 
apparent. 
13 
From the perspective of shock manipulation in forecasting practice, one can 
distinguish between hard tunes and soft tunes (Andrle et al. (2009) and Andrle (2008)). 
Conditioning (hard tunes) on exogenous or endogenous variables paths is easy to 
calculate and delivers implied structural shocks. More specifically, hard tune means that 
the selected variable will have a certain predetermined value in a given simulation and the 
corresponding shock (shocks) will be generated endogenously. It means that the value of 
the fixed variable is the same for all model simulations, however, the corresponding 
shock (or set of shocks) that is (are) consistent with that value will change from one 
simulation to another. Thus, hard tune resembles observed v
. The choice of shocks and their period of occurrence (past, current or future) matter 
a lot since the underlying economics is rather different then.  
Setting shocks in a simulation (soft tunes) works similarly to structural shock 
scenarios. Soft tune means that the given variable will have some value for one (let’s say 
baseline) simulation and t
tions, therefore the variable of interest will not be fixed at the predetermined value 
in subsequent simulations.  
In case of combining anticipated and unanticipated shocks the result of hard and 
soft tunes simulations may differ. The recommendation one may draw from the analysis 
is that independently of the events being announced or unanticipated, the simulation of 
alternative s
scenario.     
 
3.1.3.  Anticipated and unanticipated shock simulation: An example 
 
To illustrate the differences between anticipated and unanticipated shock simulations, we 
present estimates of the impact of a temporary increase of foreign prices
14 on some 
selected m
D
                                                 
13 For example, a protracted period of time (with respect to a particular model’s dynamics) of high 
nominal interest rates may eventually and clearly lead to higher inflation as the economy and real 
interest rates strive to converge to equilibrium. 
14 The rationale for simulating foreign prices (or foreign interest rates or foreign demand) as 
anticipated shocks is quite well motivated. Many central banks rely on publicly available forecasts 
of foreign exogenous (exogenous, when the forecasting model is not based on a multi-country 
setup) variables, such as Consensus Forecast, etc. in their forecasting practice. These commercial 
e goods that are used for the production of final goods. The model explicitly works 
products often reflect the anticipations of a wide range of analysts in many countries. Many 
institutions subsequently use these publicly available forecasts; therefore, it is plausible to assume 
that the shocks, replicating the assumptions about the future path of exogenous variables, are 
treated as anticipated. 
15 The model builds on the New-Keynesian tradition. It exhibits important nominal (wage and 
price and import price rigidities) and real (habit formation and investment adjustment costs) 
frictions in the economy enriching the real business cycle dynamics. To capture important stylized 
facts of the Czech economy, the model is multisectoral, including domestic and imported 
intermediat
  14 
Figure 1.  Macroeconomic impact of anticipated and unanticipated increases in 
foreign prices  




































































Note:   ll responses are reported as deviations from the model’s baseline in %.  A
 
Higher foreign prices lead, ceteris paribus, to increased domestic inflation via the 
import price channel. In the case of the unanticipated shock, the jump in foreign prices 
leads to higher net inflation during the period when the shock takes place (Figure 1). In 
reaction to the positive foreign price inflation pressures, the central bank increases 
nominal (and real) interest rates, thus suppressing the main components of real GDP, 
such as real consumption and investment. The initial nominal exchange rate appreciation, 
that is fully consistent with the uncovered interest rate parity condition and the central 
bank’s reaction function, substantially mitigates the inflationary impact of foreign prices 
on domestic inflation. Consequently, inflation returns back to its target through gradually 
                                                                                                                                      
with trends in sectoral relative prices, real exchange rate appreciation, high import-intensity of 
s, imperfect exchange rate pass-through, investment specific shocks and increase in trade 
openness. Foreign variables (GDP, interest rates and PPI) are modeled as a simple AR(1) 
export
processes. 
  15falling import price inflation. On the whole, the economy returns back to its steady-state 
level relatively quickly due to falling nominal and real interest rates consistent with 
inflation returning back to target.  
Contrary to the case where the shock is unanticipated, the possibility for agents to 
react to the shock in advance significantly changes the dynamic response of the presented 
variables. Now, agents know the timing and the magnitude of the future shock and adjust 
their behaviour to it from the beginning. The nominal exchange rate appreciates before 
the shock hits the economy (the magnitude and timing depends critically on the 
anticipation horizon). This anti-inflationary effect is consistent with lower inflation and 
interest rates. Lower real interest rates as well as prices motivate agents to increase their 
consumption and investment. Because foreign inflation is unchanged in the first four 
eriods and the nominal exchange rate is appreciated, foreign inputs are cheaper for 
stment expenditures
16. 
 Appendix C we show how responses to anticipated temporary foreign price shock vary 
projec
d by the fact that, when making choices, private economic agents form 
expectations about future realization of policy variables. In other words, agents’ response 
 expected course of action taken by policymakers. This 
ction illustrates implications of alternative assumptions regarding the endogeneity of 
from the baseline) paths for interest and exchange rates over 
the sc
p
domestic residents, which, in turn motivates them to increase inve
In
with a horizon of anticipation (2, 4, and 6 quarters ahead). In particular, the initial 
appreciation of nominal exchange rate is higher the smaller the announcement period is. 
 
3.2.  Treatment of interest and exchange rates 
 
The design of a scenario exercise often requires deciding which variables should be 
treated as endogenous or exogenous. In particular, in preparing macroeconomic 
tions, it is common practice to conduct scenario analysis where policy-relevant 
variables are treated as predetermined variables: government consumption, short-term 
interest and exchange rates. Yet, these assumptions bear important implications for 
model-based simulation results, as they modify the shock propagation mechanism, and, 
thus, may substantially alter quantitative (and possibly qualitative) results of the analysis.  
The importance of alternative treatment of policy variables in DSGE models is 
augmente
to shocks crucially depends on the
se
nominal interest and exchange rates for the analysis of the transmission of economic 
shocks.  
 
3.2.1.  Design of the exercise  
 
For the sake of expositional clarity, in what follows, we consider one typical demand-side 
(export preference) shock and one supply-side (domestic price mark-up) shock. We 
investigate the impact of these shocks on real GDP and consumer prices under alternative 
assumptions regarding short-term interest and exchange rates. First, we report simulation 
results assuming unchanged (
enario horizon. Following the ECB’s practice of using the NAWM in projection 
exercises, conditioning of interest and exchange rates is implemented assuming an 
                                                 
16 Note that investment goods are assumed to be produced by using imported goods only. 
  16implied sequence of unexpected innovations to the monetary policy and uncovered 
interest parity shocks, respectively. Second, we allow for an endogenous response in both 
interest and exchange rates.  
Our quantitative analysis is based on the simulation results obtained using the 
estimated DSGE models of the ECB (NAWM) and the National Bank of Hungary
17. 
While in both models the exchange rate dynamics is modelled in terms of a standard 
uncovered interest parity condition, the monetary policy rules feature some differences. In 
the NAWM, the rule is based on a systematic reaction of the short-term interest rate to 
deviations of domestic inflation and output growth from their respective target. In the 
Hungarian model, monetary authorities put zero weight on output stabilization and focus 
mainl
rate of real exports, whereas a 
rice mark-up shock is calibrated consistently with a one percentage-point increase in the 
rms of timing, the shock (or rather the 
novation to the shock
18) takes place in quarter 1 and has contemporaneous effects on 
for th
                                                
y on stabilizing domestic inflation and the exchange rate. We have opted to use 
these two models to analyse the role of monetary policy rules in economies featuring 
different degree of openness. As it turns out, the openness of the economy matters for the 
shock propagation under alternative treatment of interest and exchange rates in 
simulations.   
In all simulations we consider transitory (one-off) unanticipated shocks only. The 
size of a shock (impulse) is implied by an assumed transitory unanticipated change in an 
observed variable. In particular, an export preference shock is calibrated consistently with 
a one percentage-point increase in the quarterly growth 
p
quarterly growth rate of the GDP deflator. In te
in
the rest of model variables. Starting from quarter 2 onwards the model is solved for all 
endogenous variables (including those directly shocked). 
 
3.2.2.  Discussion of the simulation results   
 
The key results of the exercise are summarized in Table 2. It shows the responses of 
annual growth rates of real GDP and of the consumption deflator (or CPI) to the export 
preference and the domestic price mark-up shock under alternative assumptions about 
nominal short-term interest and exchange rates over a five-year period. In addition, 
Figures 2 and 3 display impulse responses of real GDP, consumer prices, nominal interest 
and exchange rates in terms of percentage deviations from the model’s baseline, except 
e response of the interest rate, which is reported as annualised percentage-point 
deviation. Besides two central scenarios, in order to single out the incremental 
contribution of the exchange rate based adjustment mechanism, we also report simulation 
results of an interim step where we allow for an endogenous response of the nominal 
interest rate combined with a fixed path for the nominal exchange rate.  
Let us start with the export preference shock simulation results for the NAWM. 
Following the shock to export demand, aggregate demand rises and induces some upward 
price pressures. Under endogenous policy response, the interest rate rises and dampens 
 
17 See Jakab and Világi (2008) for model documentation. 
18 In the case of the NAWM, the structural shocks considered in this section are specified as AR(1) 
processes. As regards the Hungarian model, the export preference shock is specified as an AR(1) 
process while the price mark-up shock follows a white-noise process. 
  17domestic demand. Moreover, the higher domestic interest rate triggers an appreciation of 
the domestic currency, thus, curtailing export demand to some extent. The counteractive 
omestic monetary policy response also helps to reduce the surge in inflation following 
e higher level of output 
c mbined with s ndog ses 
facilitates a more favourable output-inflation trade-off faced by
 
Table 2. Responses to export preference  cks under 
a assum ns e M  
on an export r sp to e i
k o
d
the shock as well as to speed up the return to equilibrium conditions. As shown in Figure 
2, the flexibility of nominal exchange rate allows to achiev
o maller increase in prices, i.e. e enous exchange rate respon
 policymakers. 
and domestic price mark-up sho
lternative  ptio  in th  NAW  and the MNB model 
  R sp e se to     p efe r enc   e
shock 
Re onse   a  om d stic pr ce 
mar -up sh ck 
  1y 2y 3y 4y 5y 1y 2y 3y 4y 5y 
  Exogenous policy interest and exchange rates 
NAWM            
Real  GDP  0.35  0.11 -0.11 -0.13 -0.11 -0.80 -0.05 0.05  0.01  0.02 
Cons.  deflator  0.06 0.14 0.10 0.04 -0.02 2.12 0.35 -0.54  -0.51  -0.45 
MNB model            
Real  GDP  0.74 -0.48 -0.23 -0.02 0.00 -0.36 -0.09 0.10  0.12  0.10 
CPI  0.05 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.00 1.50 0.28 -0.30  -0.38  -0.34 
  Endogenous policy interest and exchange rates 
NAWM            
Real  GDP  0.22  0.00 -0.07 -0.05 -0.03 -1.62 -0.41 0.68  0.53  0.30 
Cons.  deflator  0.02 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.00 2.02 0.00 -0.66  -0.36  -0.15 
MNB model            
Real  GDP  0.71 -0.47  -0.21  -0.01 0.00 -0.63 0.12 0.26 0.15 0.07 
CPI  0.04 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.44 0.14 -0.29  -0.25  -0.18 
Note: Impulse-responses of real GDP and GDP deflator show percentage-point deviations of 
annual average growth rates in the variables following the realization of the shock from their 
respective baseline (when no shocks occur) annual average growth rates.  
 
Under the assumption of fixed interest and exchange rates, domestic monetary 
policy
erence shock and at the same time inflation is more or less cushioned 
(see F
n in domestic demand and also initially 
induces appreciation of the domestic currency vis-à-vis the rest of the world. The 
 becomes accommodating and the adjustment-enhancing channel of 
competitiveness is substantially muted. In line with the monetary policy rule, private 
agents expect a monetary policy tightening; however, an unchanged nominal interest rate  
surprises them positively.  As a result, the impact of the shock will be not only bigger, but 
also it will take longer for the economy to return to the baseline path. 
As regards the impact of the shock in a much smaller and more open economy 
(such as the Hungarian economy) the domestic output response is very much influenced 
by the export pref
igure 3). This reflects the relative strength of the adjustment mechanism in the 
Hungarian economy based on the real exchange rate (external competitiveness) channel. 
Domestic monetary policy is less effective in counteracting the strong output effects, but 
offsets inflationary consequences. The latter, though, are less pronounced than in a more 
closed economy. 
Turning to the price mark-up shock, in the NAWM the endogenous monetary 
policy response clearly implies a larger contraction of output (see Table 2). At the same 
time, active monetary policy produces a somewhat smaller increase in domestic inflation. 
The higher interest rate stimulates a reductio
  18quanti
dogenous response of the nominal 
excha
the model estimation strategy, which typically assumes 
at shocks are unanticipated. For above reasons an endogenous treatment of interest and 
exchange rates in model simulation exercises is advisable. Any scenarios featuring an 
alternative treatment of interest and exchange rates should be prudently compared against 
such a benchmark scenario.         
 
tative importance of the exchange rate changes for the overall transmission of the 
shock in the NAWM, however, is found to be rather negligible. Similar to the analysis of 
the demand–side shock discussed above, we find that active monetary policy facilitates 
faster macroeconomic adjustment (Figure 2).  
In the Hungarian model featuring a higher degree of external openness, the major 
channel of transmission of monetary policy is through the nominal exchange rate (see 
Figure 3). Similarly to the NAWM, in the Hungarian model the endogenous domestic 
monetary policy response results in a bigger initial reduction in output as compared to the 
simulation under exogenous policy interest rate assumption (see Table 2). Contrary to the 
NAWM-based simulation results, allowing for en
nge rate results in a substantially larger initial output contraction and a faster return 
to the baseline as compared to simulations based on the assumption of a fixed exchange 
rate. In terms of inflation performance, the Hungarian model-based results are similar to 
the corresponding results produced by the NAWM.  
These simple simulations illustrate the non-negligible implications of alternative 
assumptions regarding monetary and exchange rate responses for model reactions to 
shocks, in particular on the speed and size of the macroeconomic adjustment. Imposition 
of the exogenous path for interest and exchange rates may significantly alter impulse-
responses and the economic interpretation of the scenario. In case of an unanticipated 
exogenous path, such an assumption implies additional shocks to interest and exchange 
rates, since model-based expectations are not fulfilled. On the other hand, assuming an 
anticipated exogenous path may raise modelling issues, as the expectation formation 
mechanism turns inconsistent with the underlying structure of the model. In case of 
estimated DSGE models, such as used in this section, considering anticipated shocks is 
also inconsistent with respect to 
th
  19Figure 2. Responses to export preference and domestic price mark-up shocks under 
alternative assumptions in the NAWM, in % 
Export preference shock 































































Domestic price mark-up shock 































































Note: Legend “Exogenous” refers to model simulations assuming a predetermined path for the 
nominal short-term interest and exchange rates; legend “Endogenous” denotes model simulations 
allowing for an endogenous response of nominal short-term interest and exchange rates; legend 
“Interim” refers to model simulations allowing for an endogenous response of the nominal short-
term interest rate and assuming a predetermined path for nominal exchange rate. All responses are 
reported as percentage deviations from the model’s baseline, except for the response of the interest 
rate, which is reported as annualised percentage-point deviation.     
  20Figure 3. Responses to export preference and domestic price mark-up shocks under 
alternative assumptions in the Hungarian DSGE model, in % 
































































































































Note: Legend “Exogenous” refers to model simulations assuming a predetermined path for the 
nominal short-term interest and exchange rates; legend “Endogenous” denotes model simulations 
allowing for an endogenous response of the nominal short-term interest and exchange rates; legend 
“Interim” refers to model simulations allowing for an endogenous response of the nominal short-
term interest rate and assuming a predetermined path for nominal exchange rate. All responses are 
reported as percentage deviations from the model’s baseline, except for the response of the interest 
rate, which is reported as annualised percentage-point deviation. 
  213.3.  Fiscal scenarios in DSGE models 
 
In the current international environment, shaped by the global financial crisis and the 
myriad of the fiscal stimulus packages approved in many countries, the policymaking 
institutions
19 intensively use DSGE models to assess the impact and adequacy of the 
fiscal expansion. While, at the current juncture, fiscal scenarios are highly topical, in the 
context of our study, they can also be used to highlight numerous issues related to 
scenario implementation in DSGE models. In particular, this subsection illustrates the 
sensitivity of DSGE-based simulations with regard to the assumed duration of the fiscal 
shock, alternative specification of fiscal policy rules, alternative treatment of monetary 
policy and potential international spillover effects. 
The quantitative DSGE-based analysis in this subsection is based on two DSGE 
models: the Banque de France multi-country model (BdF-GIMF) and the Banco de 
Portugal small-open economy model (PESSOA). These models share a number of 
features with most DSGE models currently being used; however they also entail some 
significant differences in the modelling of households’ behaviour.  In particular, BdF-
GIMF and PESSOA share a number of features with the GIMF model of the IMF. These 
models include appealing features for fiscal policy simulations, since, thanks to the 
overlapping generations’ structure, both liquidity constrained and non-liquidity 
constrained households are intrinsically non-Ricardian. The multi-country DSGE models 
enable a richer assessment of spillover effects and the gains from international policy 
coordination. In addition, in order to benchmark fiscal policy simulations and to illustrate 
some differences between DSGE models and more traditional macroeconometric models, 
we use NiGEM-based simulations. NiGEM includes a menu of options that can be tuned 
to make the model more similar to a DSGE model or closer to a traditional 
macroeconometric model. In particular, choices can be made regarding nominal rigidities, 
the Ricardian equivalence and households’ forward-looking behaviour. NiGEM also 
features liquidity-constrained consumers (the contemporaneous elasticity of consumption 
to current income can always be interpreted as the proportion of disposable income held 
by liquidity-constrained agents). Financial markets are forward-looking, with long-run 
and expected short-run interest rates being linked by a yield curve equation. 
The structure of this subsection is as follows: firstly, we present the central fiscal 
scenario results featuring a temporary fiscal expansionary shock; secondly, we analyze 
the implications of a permanent fiscal shock; thirdly, we investigate the role of the fiscal 
rule by considering its alternative specification; fourthly, the role of the monetary policy 
rule and implications of switching it off temporarily are discussed; fifthly, we address the 
implications of a coordinated increase in government consumption across the world 
                                                 
19 The utilisation of general equilibrium models for the assessment of the impact of expansionary 
fiscal policy is quite common in the literature (Baxter and King (1993), Blanchard and Perroti 
(2002) and more recently Galí et al. (2007), Mountford and Uhlig (2008), Forni et al. (2009) and 
Corsetti et al. (2009)). However, the utilisation of the new generation of models in policy making 
institutions for regular analysis has started more recently with the Global Economy Model (GEM) 
and the Global Integrated Monetary and Fiscal Model (GIMF) by the IMF and a number of the 
DSGE models developed in many central banks (European Central Bank, Federal Reserve Board, 
Bank of England, Bank of Finland, Bank of Sweden and Bank of Norway, among others). See, for 
example, the IMF staff position note “The case for fiscal policy stimulus” by Freedman et al. 
(2009). 
  22economy as compared to unilateral fiscal expansionary policy. Finally, we conclude and 
derive some practical recommendations for fiscal policy simulations using DSGE models. 
 
3.3.1.  The fiscal multipliers in the central scenario 
 
In the discussion of fiscal policy issues, the magnitude of the fiscal multipliers is a key 
issue. It reflects how powerful fiscal policy might be as a macroeconomic stabilisation 
device. In the context of the fiscal stimulus debate, the magnitude of the multiplier of 
each expenditure and revenue item is relevant in setting the best policy mix to achieve the 
degree of stimulus desired. However, there is still no consensus on the effectiveness of 
temporary fiscal measures. Given empirical difficulties related to estimating multipliers, 
short-run multipliers may vary widely according to the estimation approaches, from 
negative numbers to figures above unity. These differences may be explained by the 
degree of financing constraints faced by the country, the openness of the economy, the 
monetary policy response and the reaction of private agents’ saving. The uncertainty on 
the size of fiscal multipliers is well documented in Van Brusselen (2009) (see Table 3). It 
is noteworthy that DSGE multipliers are generally larger than those from traditional 
macroeconometric models. 
 













Low High Low High Low High Low High 
Public spending 
multipliers 
1.0  1.4 -3.77  3.68 -0.6  1.6  0.0  3.9 
Tax cut multipliers  -  3.0 -4.75  2.64 -0.4  1.3  -2.63*  -0.23* 
Note: * Results for a large economy from the IMF’s Global Fiscal Model. 
Source: Van Brusselen (2009). 
 
The fiscal blocks of the DSGE models under consideration are quite disaggregated 
and, therefore, allow for the simulation of expansionary fiscal policy through alternative 
instruments. Thus, on the revenue side, a stimulus on labour income tax, consumption tax 
or firms’ social security payments may be considered; while on the expenditure side, one 
may consider a stimulus on government consumption, government investment, 
government transfers (targeted or untargeted). In this paper, for exposition clarity, we will 
focus on the results of government consumption expansion (simulations results for 
temporary fiscal stimulus featuring alternative instruments can be found in Appendix D).  
We consider a temporary fiscal stimulus as the central scenario, consisting of an 
expansion of government consumption amounting to 1% of the initial steady-state GDP 
over a four-quarter period. We assume that the fiscal consolidation will start in the 
beginning of the fifth quarter and will be achieved through the full reversion of the 
stimulus and by the adjustment of the labour income tax to bring the government debt 
ratio back to its target value. Furthermore, it is assumed that both the expansionary 
                                                 
20 The narrative record method attempts to discriminate between automatic and discretionary 
changes in spending or taxation (or both) on the basis of available historical information regarding 
discretionary changes in fiscal stances (Van Brusselen, 2009). 
  23package and the consolidation strategy are announced from the outset and are fully 
credible.  
In the central scenario the monetary policy rule operates during the whole 
simulation period, implying that some crowding-out effects arise from the fiscal 
expansion. Furthermore, we assume full credibility of fiscal stimulus, implying that the 
risk premium is not affected by the fiscal expansion. In the case of PESSOA, this implies 
that interest rates will remain unchanged over the simulation horizon, since they are taken 
as exogenous for a small-open economy participating in the euro area. 
 
Table 4. The impact of a temporary government consumption shock 
   PESSOA  BdF-GIMF  NiGEM 
    1y 2y 3y 1y 2y 3y 1y 2y 3y 
CPI inflation    0.2 0.2 -0.3 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.2 
Real GDP    0.8 -0.9 -0.5 1.0 -0.3 -0.3 0.7 0.5 0.1 
Multiplier    1.4 -  - 1.3 -  - 1.1 -  - 
Fiscal balance    -0.6 0.0 0.1 -0.8 -0.2 -0.1 -0.7 0.0 0.1 
Public debt    -0.3 0.7 0.7 -0.2 0.5 0.5  -  -  - 
Notes:  The values in the table show the deviation from the baseline level in percentage point for 
CPI inflation, fiscal balance (as a % of GDP) and public debt (as a % of GDP). For real GDP the 
percentage deviation from baseline level is presented. Since the shock is defined as an increase in 
government consumption of 1 % of steady-state GDP, the ex-post deterioration in fiscal balance 
ratio tends to fall below 1 pp., due to the endogenous response of fiscal revenues. The fiscal 
multiplier is obtained as the ratio of the GDP deviation from steady-state per percentage point of 
ex-post deterioration of the fiscal balance to GDP ratio. PESSOA reports simulations for the 
Portuguese economy; BdF-GIMF and NiGEM show results for the euro area. 
 
Quantitatively, we find that fiscal multipliers on government consumption are 
positive in the first year for all models. In the medium run as the fiscal consolidation 
starts and the fiscal expansion is fully reverted, the initially positive impact of fiscal 
expansion on real activity becomes negative in the case of the DSGE models, but not in 
the case of NiGEM
21 (see Table 4). It is noteworthy that short-run multipliers differ quite 
substantially across countries in both BdF-GIMF and NiGEM, being the largest in the 
United States (see also some country specific simulation results based on NiGEM in 
Appendix E). Manteu and Martins (2009) identify the level of openness and the degree of 
borrowing constraints as key determinants of the strength of the impact on GDP of the 
fiscal stimulus. 
In the case of the PESSOA model, after the initial expansionary impact on 
economic activity, the simulation suggests a strong macroeconomic reversion. This 
reflects in particular the fact that in a small-open economy model, the fiscal stimulus 
impact on prices triggers real exchange rate appreciation, which has strong implications 
for the trade balance and net foreign assets inducing a sizeable negative wealth effect. 
Moreover, the fiscal rule imposes a rapid reversion of debt implying a substantial increase 
in labour income tax as soon as fiscal consolidation starts. Finally, it should be recalled 
that in the case of PESSOA interest rates are exogenous and, therefore, the reversion of 
the fiscal stimulus is not cushioned by an eventual monetary policy response. 
                                                 
21 We do not report the impact on the euro area public debt in NiGEM simulations since there is no 
aggregate variable available in the model but only public debt levels of individual member 
countries. 
  24In the case of BdF-GIMF, the fiscal rule is laxer and allows for a slower return to 
a balanced budget. Reversal in households’ consumption after the fiscal stimulus remains 
very limited, as the adjustment of hours worked is weak and net exports deterioration is 
rather small. 
In the case of NiGEM, financial markets operate in a forward-looking framework 
(bonds, equity and exchange rates) and react instantaneously to the shock, leading to 
some crowding-out of the impact of the increase in spending through higher interest rates 
and exchange rate appreciation. However, the behaviour of households is fully backward 
looking in the sense they react to current income and wealth and not to permanent 
income, which limits negative wealth effects arising from future increases in taxes. 
 
3.3.2.  Permanent versus temporary fiscal policy shocks 
 
A key issue in the simulation of fiscal policy shocks is the reversibility of the fiscal 
measures undertaken. In general, fiscal stimulus packages tend to be temporary, implying 
that the measures included must be designed so as to make them easily reversible. 
However, one can also use DGSE models to assess the impact of permanent fiscal 
shocks
22. For instance, the assessment of a fiscal consolidation process through a 
programme of permanent cuts in expenditure is tantamount to a permanent fiscal policy 
shock. 
To assess the impact of a permanent public spending expansion, we consider a 
permanent expansion of government consumption expenditures by 1% of initial steady-
state GDP level and we compare it with the temporary shock simulation previously 
described (the central scenario). As in the central scenario, the fiscal rule is switched off 
in the first year. From the second year onwards, the fiscal rule is switched on, adjusting 
the labour income tax rate to bring the government debt ratio back to its target value. 
Contrary to what occurs in the central scenario, the increase in government consumption 
is not reverted to its pre-shock level. As in the case of the temporary shock, the 
expansionary package and the fiscal instrument, on which the fiscal rule is based, are 
announced from the outset and are fully credible. 
The DSGE model-based simulation results in Table 5 point to a substantially 
different impact of a permanent government consumption expansion in comparison with 
the central scenario (see Table 4 for comparison). The differences between a transitory 
and a permanent government consumption shock are much smaller in NiGEM 
simulations. 
In the case of PESSOA, the multiplier of a permanent shock in the first year is 
smaller than in the case of a temporary shock, reflecting the powerful wealth effects 
stemming from the permanent increase in government expenditure on households 
consumption path. Over the medium-run, as fiscal consolidation starts, the impact on real 
GDP and the multiplier becomes largely negative, not only as a result of a much stronger 
real exchange appreciation than in the central scenario, but mostly due to the larger 
                                                 
22 It should be noted, that the permanent fiscal shock scenario described in this section corresponds 
to a transition between two steady states, simulated with a non-linear version of the model under 
perfect foresight, whereas in section 2.1.1 the discussion of a permanent shock simulation 
corresponds to a unit root shock simulated within a linearized version of the model under rational 
expectations. 
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expenditure. This increase in labour income tax rate triggers a strong disincentive for 
households to supply labour affecting the consumption/leisure decision significantly. As a 
result of the higher distortion implied by the increase of the labour income tax rate, in the 
new steady state real wages (hours worked) will be above (below) their initial steady-state 
levels. 
 
Table 5. The impact of a permanent government consumption shock 
 PESSOA  BdF-GIMF  NiGEM 
  1y 2y 3y 1y 2y 3y 1y 2y 3y 
CPI inflation  0.3 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.0 0.2 0.2 
Real GDP  0.4 -1.8 -2.6 0.5 -0.3 -0.4 0.6 0.4 0.2 
Multiplier  0.4 -  - 0.6 -  - 0.9 -  - 
Fiscal balance  -1.0 0.7  0.3 -0.9 -0.1 -0.1 -0.7 -0.3 -0.2 
Public debt  0.3 1.0 0.8 0.1 0.7 0.7  -  -  - 
Notes: See explanatory notes in Table 4. 
 
The mechanisms leading to a smaller impact multiplier in the case of a permanent 
shock are quite similar in BdF-GIMF. First, there are no gains in private consumption in 
year 1 as compared to the central scenario (and there are some decreases in years 2 and 
3). Second, the deterioration of the trade balance is larger due to the larger appreciation in 
the effective real exchange rate.  
 
3.3.3.  The role of fiscal rule specification  
 
The fiscal instrument, adjusted endogenously by the fiscal rule, is an important choice of 
the modeller and should reflect the most likely behaviour of the government during the 
consolidation period. Usually, fiscal rules adjust a specific tax rate in order to meet a 
specific fiscal surplus or debt ratio target. One should be aware that the choice of the 
instrument is likely to affect results to some extent. In what follows, we illustrate the 
sensitivity of model responses to alternative setting of fiscal rules in the DSGE models.
23 
To assess the impact of using alternative fiscal consolidation instruments in the 
rule, we consider the central scenario that features a labour income tax based 
consolidation and we simulate two additional scenarios in which the fiscal consolidation 
is based on the consumption tax and on a lump-sum tax. The results presented in Table 6 
for PESSOA and in Table 7 for BdF-GIMF were obtained under the assumption of 
perfect credibility of the fiscal policy strategy. 
Starting with the PESSOA model, the simulation results suggest that the fiscal 
consolidation instrument might affect the impact of the fiscal expansion and the 
magnitude of the impact multipliers. The consumption tax rule has the highest multiplier 
                                                 
23 The PESSOA model includes a structural budget balance rule, following Kumhof and Laxton 
(2007). This type of rule implies a reaction that depends on the specific characteristics of the shock 
under consideration. In the case of permanent shocks, the fiscal instrument adjusts to ensure that 
the public debt stock is kept close to its target level, while in the case of temporary shocks, the 
debt stock may deviate sensibly from the target, accommodating most of the impact of the 
operation of automatic stabilisers, keeping the fiscal instrument, the labour income tax rate, 
broadly unchanged. As in PESSOA, the fiscal rule in BdF-GIMF aims at the long-run stabilisation 
of the public deficit to GDP ratio. However the business cycle stabilization component of the fiscal 
policy is made more explicit in BdF-GIMF, by making the public deficit contra-cyclical. 
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households as they are aware that the consumption tax rate and CPI inflation will increase 
more substantially as the fiscal consolidation starts. This not only boosts activity, but also 
has a favourable impact on consumption tax revenues, limiting the budget balance 
deterioration.  The lump-sum tax based consolidation has a slightly lower multiplier, 
since it does not yield so much tax revenues in the first year. The central scenario has the 
lowest multiplier and in the medium-run is the one that implies a larger decline in GDP 
reflecting the strong distortion in the consumption/leisure decision imposed by the 
increase in the labour income tax.  
 
Table 6. The impact of a government consumption shock under alternative 
fiscal rule instruments (PESSOA) 
Central scenario  Consumption tax rule  Lump-sum tax rule   
1y 2y 3y 1y 2y 3y 1y 2y 3y 
CPI inflation  0.2 0.2 -0.3 0.3 0.6 -0.4 0.2 0.2 -0.3 
Real GDP  0.8 -0.9 -0.5 0.9 -0.8 -0.2 0.9 -0.6 -0.1 
Multiplier  1.4 -  - 1.9 -  - 1.7 -  - 
Fiscal balance  -0.6 0.0 0.1 -0.5 -0.2 0.0 -0.6 0.0 0.1 
Public debt  -0.3 0.7 0.7 -0.4 0.5 0.6 -0.3 0.6 0.5 
Notes: See explanatory notes in Table 4. 
 
The impact of the alternative adjustment instruments is found to be far less 
important in BdF-GIMF: simulations featuring alternative fiscal policy rules are giving 
the same impact multipliers. One possible explanation for the robust estimates of fiscal 
multiplies is the particular specification of fiscal policy rule employed in BdF-GIMF: 
since the effect of fiscal policy on GDP is directly taken into account in BdF-GIMF, the 
government tries to minimize the distortionary effects of its policy. 
 
Table 7. The impact of a government consumption shock under alternative 
fiscal rule instruments (BdF-GIMF) 
Central scenario  Consumption tax rule  Lump-sum tax rule   
1y 2y 3y 1y 2y 3y 1y 2y 3y 
CPI inflation  0.5 0.5 0.3 0.8 0.5 -0.1 0.5 0.5 0.2 
Real GDP  1.0 -0.3 -0.3 1.1 -0.3 -0.3 1.1 -0.2 -0.2 
Multiplier  1.3 -  - 1.2 -  - 1.2 -  - 
Fiscal balance  -0.8 -0.2 -0.1 -0.9 -0.2 -0.1 -0.8 -0.2 -0.1 
Public debt  -0.2 0.5 0.5 -0.2 0.7 0.7 -0.2 0.6 0.6 
Notes: See explanatory notes in Table 4. 
 
NiGEM also features an automatic solvency rule, which ensures long-run 
government solvency by stabilising the budget deficit and the debt stock thanks to an 
increase in the direct tax rate. We do not run simulations with NiGEM under alternative 
fiscal rules since the available modelling option is limited to switching off/on the rule and 
does not allow tackling the form of the rule. 
 
3.3.4.  The role of the monetary policy rule  
 
The reaction of monetary policy is another crucial issue in implementing a fiscal scenario. 
Indeed, DSGE models may not converge in presence of too large shocks if monetary 
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default Taylor rule, adjusting the short-term interest rates to past levels of interest rates, 
output gap and inflation. As regards PESSOA, the nominal interest rate is taken as 
exogenous since in the small-open economy idiosyncratic developments are not likely to 
affect monetary policy decisions in the EA as a whole. Thus, the model does not contain a 
monetary policy rule and the stability of the nominal variables is ensured by real 
exchange rate developments, which have powerful impacts on trade and imposes a 
mechanism similar to a price level targeting. 
In Table 8 we report simulation results of the same experiment as in the central 
scenario, except that during the first year of the scenario the monetary policy is 
exogenous, i.e. the Taylor rule is temporarily suspended and the nominal interest rate is 
held at its steady-state value. In this scenario we assume that the exogenous setting of the 
interest rate is fully anticipated, i.e. economic agents are well informed about temporary 
monetary policy accommodation and believe it. 
Starting with the BdF-GIMF results, compared to Table 4, the fiscal multiplier is 
markedly higher when the monetary policy is accommodating during the period of the 
fiscal stimulus. On the contrary, in the subsequent years, fiscal multipliers are even more 
negative with monetary accommodation, but the net cumulated effect of monetary 
accommodation is clearly positive. Country-specific simulation results reveal that the 
gain from accommodative monetary policies depends on the inertia of the monetary 
policy. For instance, we find that gains are lower for the EA than for the United States. 
 
Table 8. The impact of a temporary government consumption 
shock with monetary policy accommodation 
   BdF-GIMF  NiGEM 
    1y 2y 3y 1y 2y 3y 
CPI inflation    2.6 5.2 3.4 0.1 0.3 0.2 
Real GDP    3.4 1.0 -0.9 0.7 0.5 0.2 
Multiplier    3.4 -  - 1.2 -  - 
Fiscal balance    -1.0 0.2 -0.7 -0.6 0.0 0.1 
Public debt   -2.1  -3.0  -3.7  -  -  - 
Notes: See explanatory notes in Table 4. 
 
As regards NiGEM, in the first year fiscal multipliers under alternative treatment 
of monetary policy differ negligibly. The multipliers mainly differ in years 2 and 3. 
Overall, the impact of the fiscal stimulus on GDP, private consumption, inflation and 
hours worked is quite similar in both scenarios, although, the impact on business and 
residential investment is larger under exogenous monetary policy assumption since there 
is no crowding out. What helps to explain the proximity of the two simulations results is 
the inclusion of long-term rates in the model, which are determined by forward-looking 
markets. 
 
3.3.5.  The gains from international coordination  
 
In the central scenario above we considered domestic fiscal expansion assuming 
unchanged fiscal policy abroad. The multi-country dimension of BdF-GIMF  and 
NiGEM, however, allows us relaxing this assumption and to consider implementing a 
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1% increase in government consumption simultaneously in the 5 areas constituting BdF-
GIMF (the US, the EA, Japan, the rest of Asia and the rest of the world) and in the EA, 
the US and Japan in case of NiGEM. Similar to the central scenario, in the coordinated 
scenario monetary policy rules are treated endogenously. The key simulation results in 
case of the EA are reported in Table 9. 
 
Table 9. The impact of a temporary coordinated government 
consumption shock (results for the EA) 
   BdF-GIMF  NiGEM 
    1y 2y 3y 1y 2y 3y 
CPI inflation    0.7 0.7 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.3 
Real GDP   1.2  -0.3  -0.5  0.8  0.5 
Multiplier    1.5 -  - 1.3 - 




Public debt   -0.4  0.5  0.5  -  -  - 
Notes:  See explanatory notes in Table 4.  
 
Overall, we find that in each area the impact multiplier under coordinated fiscal 
expansion is slightly higher as compared to the individual implementation since the real 
exchange rate does not appreciate and the trade balance does not deteriorate. In BdF-
GIMF, under endogenous monetary policy reaction, the main difference in coordinated 
impulses versus individual impulses simulations (for comparison see the respective 
simulation results in Table 4) is due to the trade contribution. When stimuli are 
implemented in all the areas simultaneously, there is no exchange rate appreciation. Thus, 
imports and exports reaction to the stimuli are of the same magnitude: there is no net 
leakage of the stimulus to non-participating countries. However, the gain to fiscal 
coordination between countries is higher when monetary policy is accommodative. 
Qualitatively similar results are obtained with NiGEM  simulations. More detailed 
simulation results available for NiGEM reveal that gains from a coordinated fiscal 
expansion are greater for countries featuring closer trading links (see Appendix E). 
 
3.3.6.  Fiscal policy scenarios: some recommendations 
 
•  The simulations conducted using the DSGE models suggest that this type of 
models is particularly adequate to conduct fiscal simulations. More specifically, 
the full specification of wealth and substitution effects altering households’ intra 
and inter-temporal decisions can hardly be appropriately treated in traditional 
models. Moreover, the rigorous treatment of economic agents’ expectations is 
critical in fiscal simulation exercises. The forward-looking behaviour of 
economic agents under the rational expectations assumption in DSGE models 
leaves these models less prone to the Lucas critique than traditional backward-
looking models. 
•  The simulation of fiscal policy shocks crucially depends on a number of features 
that must be clear from the outset: the temporary vs. permanent nature of the 
shock; the number of periods where fiscal and/or monetary policy rules are turned 
off; the fiscal policy instrument on which the fiscal rule is based. 
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which it is switched off affect the simulation results; therefore these options 
should be made explicit. It is recommendable to use fiscal rules based on realistic 
instruments like the labour income tax, not only due to the fact that it enhances 
the realism of the simulation, but also due to the fact that the utilisation of non-
distortionary taxation might affect the results non-negligibly. The use of lump-
sum tax based fiscal rules might be an interesting benchmark, though not a very 
realistic case. 
•  The role of monetary policy in the context of the implementation of the fiscal 
shocks is also of major importance. Simulations should always be explicit with 
respect to possible monetary policy reactions to fiscal shocks. It is important to 
have a counterfactual exercise with monetary policy rule switched on to assess 
the implicit monetary stimulus. 
•  International spillovers seem to be rather limited in multi-country DSGE models. 
This feature is also common in traditional macroeconometric models and is likely 
to be more related to the fact that DSGE models are not yet good at modelling 
international financial linkages (the same holds for traditional models), than to 
the lack of importance of international coordination and shock spillovers. 
Therefore, at the current juncture, gains from international coordination and 
shock spillovers are likely to be underestimated.  
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The new generation of DSGE models offers a valuable contribution to the set of tools 
used by practitioners for conducting scenario analysis. Compared to more traditional 
models, they allow not only designing scenarios in a variety of ways and tackling a larger 
range of issues of interest, but  also provide an appealing structural interpretation of 
scenario setups and simulation results.  
There is growing evidence of a wider usage of DSGE models within the European 
System of Central Banks (ESCB) in preparing projections and conducting policy analysis. 
Still, it is fair to say, that the history of active use of DSGE models is rather short. The 
adoption of the DSGE approach to scenario analysis is, in many respects, an ongoing 
process and there is much to be learned about design, implementation and communication 
of DSGE-based scenario analysis. A number of national central banks of the ESCB 
continue to use traditional macroeconometric models along with DSGE models, thus 
recognising advantages and limitations of both modelling approaches. In this regard, it is 
important to emphasise that this study does not advocate a specific modelling approach; 
instead it attempts to illustrate some of the modelling issues that often arise when 
implementing scenarios using DSGE models in the context of projection exercises or 
policy analysis. These issues reflect the sensitivity of DSGE model-based analysis to 
scenario assumptions, which in more traditional (macroeconometric) models is apparently 
less critical, such as, for example, scenario event anticipation and duration, as well as the 
treatment of monetary and fiscal policy rules.  
Forward-looking behaviour embodied in DSGE models implies that simulation 
results will crucially depend on whether the realisation (size and timing) of a scenario 
event is anticipated or completely unknown and, hence, a full surprise to economic 
agents. The advantage of such a distinction (anticipated vs. unanticipated events) is that it 
allows implementing more realistic scenarios where economic agents (markets) react to 
news as they arrive. The specific choice of whether to treat shocks in simulations as either 
anticipated or unanticipated depends on a number of considerations as, for example, the 
model estimation strategy, the type of simulation exercise, etc. While there are no rigidly 
applicable rules, the choice eventually may depend on how much of the information 
concerning the scenario event is publicly available and used by economic agents. 
The treatment of interest and exchange rates in model simulations represents 
another example of critical assumptions, which bear important implications for scenario 
analysis. The setting of the nominal interest rate, typically described by a monetary policy 
rule, is a fundamental part of the model adjustment mechanism as, following a shock, 
households and firms adjust their plans by taking into account the expected response of 
the monetary authority. The endogenous monetary policy rule provides the nominal 
anchor to the model and often incorporates a smooth interest rate reaction to shocks in the 
short run. The nominal exchange rate, which is usually described by the uncovered 
interest parity condition, plays a similar stabilising role, notably in small open-economy 
models. The imposition of exogenous paths for interest and exchange rates, as often 
practiced in projection exercises, may significantly affect simulation results and their 
interpretation. For modelling consistency reasons, an endogenous treatment of interest 
and exchange rates in model simulation exercises is therefore advisable. Any scenarios 
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compared against such a benchmark case. Arguably, in projection-related simulations the 
assessment of the macroeconomic implications of alternative interest rate paths is of 
interest to policymakers. However, the evolution of future interest rates should ideally be 
a function of economic fundamentals, and not be determined in an ad-hoc manner. In this 
regard, “constant interest rate” scenarios make sense only if there is a good story of how 
the constant interest rate will be achieved and how this will be communicated to the 
market. Otherwise, interpretations of such scenarios will lack a solid basis.    
Numerous fiscal scenarios discussed in this study show that the DSGE model-
based simulation results crucially depend on a number of features that must be clear from 
the outset: the temporary vs. permanent nature of the shock; the specification of the fiscal 
policy rule and its treatment in model simulations; the assumption about the reaction of 
monetary policy. Differences in model reactions to temporary and permanent shocks can 
be related to the extent to which these shocks induce changes in permanent income and 
generate substantial wealth effects. Alternative specifications of the fiscal policy rule (the 
choice of the fiscal instrument) affect the size of economic distortions, which in turn 
influence agents’ decisions regarding leisure and consumption. Alternative treatment of 
monetary policy (constant vs. endogenous) in fiscal simulations governs the strength of 
possible crowding-out effects and, thus the size of fiscal multipliers. The international 
spillovers of fiscal shocks are found to be rather limited in the current vintage of DSGE 
models. The latter finding may reflect the fact that modelling international financial 
linkages in DSGE models is not yet satisfactory. Therefore, gains from international 
coordination and shock spillovers are likely to be underestimated. Overall, the study 
demonstrates that DSGE models are particularly useful for conducting fiscal scenarios: 
the full specification of wealth and substitution effects affecting households’ intra and 
inter-temporal decisions can hardly be treated in more traditional models. 
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  34A. Appendix: Sidrauski-Ramsey model 
 
This example uses the simplest Sidrauski-Ramsey continuous-time model with 
endogenous labour, exogenous government spending and Ricardian equivalence present. 
The phase diagram in Figure A.1 displays the dynamics of the model in case of an 
identical and permanent increase of (pure waste) government spending. The economy 
moves from initial equilibrium E0 to a new equilibrium E1. The difference in 
consumption dynamics (dash-dotted line) depends on whether government spending is 
increased as it is announced or whether there is a pre-implementation phase from period 
zero to time T. 
 
Figure A.1. Government spending shock 
 
 













The path E0 – U – E1 corresponds to unanticipated increase in government 
spending. The economy immediately jumps on its new saddle path SP1. Households cut 
consumption and undershoot on the path to new equilibrium. On the other hand the path 
E0 – A – B – E1 denotes the pre-announced government spending. The more distant the 
implementation period T is, the smaller is the initial decline in consumption and the 
economy does not jump immediately to a new saddle-path and follows dynamics driven 
both by stable and unstable eigenvalues of the model. At period T the saddle-path is 
reached (B) and the economy converges to a new steady state via different dynamics. 
Note the different welfare effects of the policy, given the consumption and labour path.  
 
 
  35B. Appendix: Sensitivity analysis with respect to 
administered prices 
 
The following appendix has been included into the October 2007 Situation Report of the 
Czech National Bank (CNB) (that is a policy document regularly prepared for the Bank 
Board). The main motivation for including this appendix into the study was to explain 
why unanticipated shocks with respect to administered prices might result in better and 
more realistic projection compared with the option of anticipated shocks. Although the 
anticipated shocks are most frequently used in CNB projections, the special properties of 
administered prices and the way in which they are modelled in the CNB’s DSGE model 
(g3) motivated the reliance on unanticipated shocks as well. Based on these simulations, 
the Bank Board agreed upon using the regulated prices projection as unanticipated with a 
certain degree of persistence to bring the simulations and forecasts closer to the perceived 
conditions prevailing in the Czech economy.  
The g3 model has been developed on the basis of specification of the behaviour of 
consumers and firms in the economy, including the (production related and budget-) 
constraints they face. The specification of administered prices, therefore, requires a 
“structural” specification as well. The way, in which these prices are incorporated into the 
model, seem to be quite important. In the current version of the model the increase of 
administered prices, ceteris paribus, results in a fall of net inflation (defined as consumer 
price inflation without the direct effect of indirect taxes and administered prices). It is 
clear, that the assumption about the future path of administered prices is one of the key 
factors affecting the whole forecast
24. 
Our starting point is the baseline projection. We assume there, that exogenous 
variables, with the exception of government expenditure and administered prices, are 
fully anticipated. The observed development of administered prices surprises consumers, 
firms, government as well as the monetary authority. Administered prices are modelled as 
an autoregressive process with a persistence coefficient 0.6.  
The first alternative scenario captures a simulation, where administered prices are 
fully anticipated.  In the first period of the projection all agents in the economy - 
consumers, firms and the monetary authorities – learn about administered prices until the 
fourth quarter of 2009. They have no uncertainty regarding this information and their 
expectation will be perfectly fulfilled. They, however, do not know the further outlook of 
administered prices since the 1Q of 2010. They anticipate their gradual return to the 
inflation target.  
                                                 
24 The incorporation of administered prices into these types of models is not entirely trivial. To our 
best knowledge this problem is not addressed in the currently available economic literature, 
colleagues from other central banks, however, are interested in how the CNB tries to address this 
problem in “g3”. The main reason, among others, is that the model explicitly deals with more 
stochastic trends, which enables modellers to abandon the assumption of constant equilibrium 
price of administered and non-administered prices. The fact, that the model framework heavily 
relies on constant expenditure shares in individual sectors, is a significant limitation. The 
alternative approach could assume that the change in administered prices – modelled as a 
permanent shock – permanently affects expenditure shares. The model in this case would converge 
to a new steady state that would be quite difficult to calibrate and analyse. 
  36The second alternative scenario incorporates the model with unanticipated 
administered prices, however with anticipated zero persistence of regulated prices by all 
agents in the model. Therefore, one-time jump in administered prices is assumed, that 
will neither be increased further nor compensated.  In reality, however, these expectations 
will repeatedly not be fulfilled and agents will be surprised every period. 
 
Figure B.1. Alternative expectations about a change in administered prices 
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Note: The simulation results are based on a DSGE model of the Czech National Bank. 
 
Figure B.1 captures the effect of an incorporation of alternative expectation 
formation with respect to administered prices on y-o-y growth of CPI inflation, 
consumption growth, the level of CZK/EUR exchange rate and nominal interest rates.  
The figures reveal that the lowest level of interest rates, the most depreciated level 
of the nominal exchange rate, the slowest convergence of consumption to its steady-state 
level and inflation to target are achieved when changes in administered prices are 
  37repeatedly unanticipated, with no persistence. Since there are no inflation pressures 
stemming from initial conditions, overall inflation pressures are very moderate. 
Therefore, monetary authorities do not feel that the rise in short-term interest rates and 
their effect on the economy is necessary to bring inflation back to target by increasing net 
inflation.  Given the observed profile of administered prices, during some periods, 
especially in 2009, the change in regulated prices is lower than the expectation of 
consumers, since they extrapolate relatively high historic values of administered prices. 
The story is different in the case, when all agents in the model perfectly anticipate 
the trajectory of administered prices. This clearly determines the path of net inflation that 
is consistent with achieving the inflation target for overall CPI inflation without the direct 
effect of indirect taxes. Similarly as in previous cases, the extent of the nominal exchange 
rate appreciation plays an important role in the adjustment process in the three considered 
scenarios. There is a clear trade-off between the level of short-term nominal interest rates 
and the appreciation of the exchange rate that is sufficient for the import of lower foreign 
inflation. Given the small weight of rental price in domestic intermediate prices and 
significant nominal rigidities, even the fall of demand for domestic intermediate products 
is not sufficient for the decrease of the profile of net inflation consistent with inflation 
targeting. 
The appreciated exchange rate, through the fall of real exports, curbs domestic 
economic activity too. The fall in exports is not accompanied by the fall in the rate of 
growth of real imports. In all scenarios there is a slowdown of domestic economic 
activity (consumption, investment) and some increase of net foreign assets, despite the 
fall of labour income. The accumulation of net foreign assets is consistent with 
the  initially higher appreciation of the nominal exchange rate than its equilibrium 
appreciation rate. At later stage, however, there is some correction towards lower rates of 
appreciation, not exceeding equilibrium. 
  38C. Appendix: Anticipated shock simulation with 
different horizon of anticipation 
 
Based on the simulation results obtained using a DSGE model of the Czech National 
Bank, Figure C.1 below displays responses to an anticipated temporary foreign price 
shock assuming alternative horizon of anticipation (2, 4, and 6 quarters ahead).  
 
Figure C.1. Anticipated shock simulation under alternative horizon of anticipation 
































































Note:  All responses are reported as percentage-point deviations from the model’s baseline. 
 
 
  39D. Appendix: Multipliers corresponding to different 
fiscal instruments 
 
Multipliers in a small-open economy model 
The results obtained with the PESSOA suggest that the most effective fiscal instrument 
to stimulate demand is public consumption, which exhibit an impact multiplier of 1.4 
followed by targeted transfers, which delivers an impact multiplier of 1.2 (see Table D.1). 
However, the transmission mechanisms are totally different. While the impact of an 
increase in government consumption stimulates the economy through an increase in the 
demand for goods used in public consumption, the increase in government transfers to 
liquidity-constrained households (targeted transfers) stimulates the demand for private 
consumption goods. The upward shift in demand leads to an increase in hours worked, 
which is more marked in the case of the government consumption expansion, reflecting 
the fact that public consumption is more intensive in labour services and has negligible 
import content in comparison to private consumption.  
 














y  2y 3y 1y  2
y  3y 1y 2y 3y  1
y  2y 3y 1y  2
y  3y 1y 2y 3y 
CPI 
inflation  0.2 0.2 -0.3 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.1 -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 -1.6 1.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
Real GDP  0.8 -0.9 -0.5 0.1 -0.5 -0.4 0.7 -0.7 -0.4 0.4 0.0 -0.2 0.3 -0.2 -0.2 0.3 0.0 -0.2
Multiplier  1.4 -  - 0.1 -  - 1.2 -  - 0.4 -  - 0.5 -  - 0.5 -  - 
Fiscal 
balance  -0.6 0.0 0.1 -0.9 0.2 0.1 -0.6 0.1 0.1 -0.9 0.3 0.2 -0.6 0.2 0.1 -0.7 0.3 0.1
Public debt  -0.3 0.7 0.7 0.4 0.9 0.7 0.0 0.7 0.6 0.4 0.7 0.5 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.4
Notes:  The values in the table show the deviation from the baseline level in percentage point for 
CPI inflation, fiscal balance (as a % of GDP) and public debt (as a % of GDP). For real GDP the 
percentage deviation from baseline level is presented. Since the shock is defined as an increase in 
government consumption of 1 % of steady-state GDP, the ex-post deterioration in fiscal balance 
ratio tends to fall below 1 pp., due to the endogenous response of fiscal revenues. The fiscal 
multiplier is obtained as the ratio of the GDP deviation from steady-state per percentage point of 
ex-post deterioration of the fiscal balance to GDP ratio. PESSOA reports simulations for the 
Portuguese economy. 
 
Concerning untargeted government transfers to households, the multipliers are far 
less significant than the ones implied by both expansion of government consumption and 
by the targeted transfers. The difference in the multipliers reflect the lower propensity to 
consume of non-liquidity constrained households, which implies a limited shift in the 
demand for consumption goods and, therefore a smaller stimulus in the production, in 
particular, in what respects to non-tradable goods and hours worked in this sector.  
The fiscal multipliers resulting from the cut in labour and capital income taxes, 
consumption tax and in employers’ social security contribution rate are the lowest, being 
very similar to the one delivered by the increase in untargeted government transfers to 
households. In fact, the transmission channel of a cut in the labour income tax or in 
consumption tax is very similar to the one through which the increase in untargeted 
transfers operates, except for the fact that transfers to households are lump sum, while 
labour income tax and consumption tax affect the consumption/leisure decision by 
households. The decline in labour income tax rate implies that households earn a higher 
  40labour income for the same wage paid by firms and therefore expand their labour supply, 
which implies that equilibrium wage will decline on impact, contrary to what occurs in 
the case of the increase in government transfers. In the same vein, the consumption tax 
cut yields a similar impact on labour supply, since it increases the amount of consumption 
goods that can be purchased for the same wage. In what respects to the cut in employers’ 
social security contributions rate, it operated mainly through an upward shift in the 
demand for labour creating an incentive for firms to use more labour intensive 
technologies and inducing an increase in wages and, eventually, a corresponding increase 
in labour supply. The increase in labour income stimulates the economy mainly through 
an increase in private consumption as in the case of the increase in labour income tax or 
government transfers. 
As regards the pattern of the fiscal consolidation from the second year onwards, it 
must be highlighted that the results presented in Table D.1 assume that the expansionary 
fiscal measure is fully reverted and that labour income tax rate is adjusted to bring public 
debt to its baseline level in line with the fiscal rule. The main qualitative difference 
between the fiscal stimulus measures on the expenditure side (government consumption 
and transfers) and tax cuts is that, the reversion of the first ones implies a significant 
rebound in the second year, while the former does not imply such a strong rebound. 
 
Multipliers in a multi-country DSGE model 
In BdF-GIMF we implement the fiscal packages alternatively using the following set of 
instruments: government investment, government consumption (these two can be 
disentangled), labour income tax, consumption tax and government (untargeted) transfers. 
The most effective fiscal instrument is government investment, followed by 
government consumption, consumption tax cuts, labour income tax cut, and finally 
government transfers being the less effective (see Table D.2). This ranking is consistent 
with that obtained with PESSOA. Note that in BdF-GIMF we can disentangle 
government investment and government consumption: our results show that the former is 
more efficient than the latter. For the most efficient tools, short-run multipliers are above 
one, which is also consistent with PESSOA but differs from traditional models such as 
NiGEM. As expected, government investment is the most efficient tool since it has a 
direct impact on aggregate demand and does not involve the forward-looking behaviours. 
However, there is a lag before investment can be implemented and the share of 
investment in government spending is limited. 
 








  1y 2y 3y 1y 2y 3y 1y 2y 3y 1y 2y 3y 1y 2y 3y 
CPI 
inflation 
0.5 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.1 -0.1 0.2 0.1 -1.5 2.1 0.2 
Real GDP  1.0 -0.3 -0.3 1.1 0.0 -0.1 0.2 -0.1 -0.2 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.5 -0.1 -0.2 
Multiplier  1.3 -  - 1.5 -  - 0.2 -  - 0.3 -  - 0.5 -  - 
Fiscal 
balance  -0.8 -0.2 -0.1 -0.7 -0.1 -0.1 -1.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.9 0.0 0.0 -0.9 0.0 -0.1 
Public 
debt  -0.2 0.5 0.5 -0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.8 0.8 0.4 0.8 0.8 0.2 0.7 0.7 
Notes:  The values in the table show the deviation from the baseline level in percentage point for 
CPI inflation, fiscal balance (as a % of GDP) and public debt (as a % of GDP). For real GDP the 
percentage deviation from baseline level is presented. Since the shock is defined as an increase in 
  41government consumption of 1 % of steady-state GDP, the ex-post deterioration in fiscal balance 
ratio tends to fall below 1 pp., due to the endogenous response of fiscal revenues. The fiscal 
multiplier is obtained as the ratio of the GDP deviation from steady-state per percentage point of ex-
post deterioration of the fiscal balance to GDP ratio. BdF-GIMF shows results for the euro area. 
 
Multipliers in a traditional multi-country model 
Using NiGEM, we implement a 1% GDP fiscal shock in the US economy along five 
possible tools: government consumption, government investment, government transfers, 
personal taxes (which do not include indirect taxes such as VAT, which are labelled as 
miscellaneous taxes) and corporate taxes. Solvency rule is turned-off the first year and 
then allowed to move. Monetary policy is reacting to the deterioration in fiscal surplus. 
Table D.3 shows that the ranking in the different tools effectiveness is the same as in the 
DSGE models, government consumption and investment being the most effective tools 
while transfers and corporate taxes being the less effective ones. Transmission 
mechanisms differ widely according to the tool: for instance, accrued government 
consumption and investment favour business investment while increased transfers and 
lower personal taxes have a larger impact on residential investment.  
 
Table D.3. The fiscal multipliers in NiGEM, stimulus in the US in % 










  1y 2y 3y 1y 2y 3y 1y 2y 3y 1y 2y 3y 1y 2y 3y 
CPI 
inflation  0.2 0.6 -0.1 0.2 0.7 -0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Real GDP  0.9 0.4 0.0 1.1 0.5 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Multiplier  1.8    1.8    0.3    0.3    0.0    
Fiscal 
balance  -0.5 -0.3 -0.1 -0.6 -0.3 -0.1 -0.6 -0.3 -0.1 -0.9 -0.7 -0.8 -0.7 -0.2 -0.2 
Notes:  The values in the table show the deviation from the baseline level in percentage point for 
CPI inflation, fiscal balance (as a % of GDP) and public debt (as a % of GDP). For real GDP the 
percentage deviation from baseline level is presented. Since the shock is defined as an increase in 
government consumption of 1 % of steady-state GDP, the ex-post deterioration in fiscal balance 
ratio tends to fall below 1 pp., due to the endogenous response of fiscal revenues. The fiscal 
multiplier is obtained as the ratio of the GDP deviation from steady-state per percentage point of 
ex-post deterioration of the fiscal balance to GDP ratio. NiGEM shows results for the US. 
  42E. Appendix: Detailed analysis on fiscal multipliers in a 
multi-country traditional model 
 
Using NiGEM, Barrell et al. (2009) quantify the effects of a one-off tax rebate, of a cut 
in the direct tax rate and of a cut in the indirect tax rate. In all scenarios monetary and 
fiscal policy rules are frozen during the first two years.  
Table E.1 shows larger multipliers for the first shock, since it is a one-off payment 
in beginning of period. Despite a marked difference in the first year, this shock becomes 
quantitatively equivalent in the medium run to the second shock, which affects the direct 
tax evenly along the year. As a result, myopic consumers take time to change their 
consumption in the second shock. Moreover, multipliers for direct tax and indirect tax are 
not ordered the same way in all the countries: in the more financially liberalised 
economies, such as the US or the UK, cuts in indirect taxes would be more efficient, 
while the result is opposite for the EA. The multipliers obtained with NiGEM are 
generally low because of the forward-looking nature of financial markets, leading to an 
immediate rise in long-term interest rates, in the exchange rate and to a decrease in equity 
prices, generating some crowding out even if monetary policy is frozen during two years.  
Table E.2 shows gains from international coordination for all types of shocks and 
all areas in case of coordinated fiscal packages implementation. Output gains reflect 
spillover effects from the stimulation of the increase in domestic GDP on the partners’ 
exports. Therefore, the most open economies, such as Netherlands, benefit the most of the 
coordination. 
 
Table E.1. Impacts on GDP of a 1 per cent of 
GDP fiscal expansion (per cent change in 
GDP) 
Table E.2. Impacts on GDP of a 1 per cent of 
GDP coordinated fiscal expansion (per cent 
change in GDP) 











  Year 1  Year 1  Year 1      Year 1  Year 1  Year 1 
US(a)  0.43 0.29  0.45   US(a)  0.49 0.33  0.52 
UK(a)  0.24 0.17  0.25   UK(a)  0.42 0.30  0.42 
Euro Area(b)  0.36 0.29  0.26   Euro  Area(b)  0.42 0.32  0.33 
Belgium(a)  0.05 0.03  0.06   Belgium(a)  0.22 0.13  0.10 
Finland(a)  0.26 0.25  0.24   Finland(a)  0.54 0.47  0.49 
France(a)  0.31 0.29  0.22   France(a)  0.46 0.39  0.34 
Germany(a)  0.32 0.31  0.28   Germany(a)  0.46 0.39  0.41 
Greece(a)  0.45 0.45  0.20   Greece(a)  0.60 0.55  0.26 
Ireland(a)  0.12 0.09  0.15   Ireland(a)  0.22 0.14  0.17 
Italy(a)  0.19 0.12  0.24   Italy(a)  0.31 0.20  0.18 
Netherlands(a)  0.24 0.19  0.22   Netherlands(a)  0.71 0.54  0.55 
Austria(a)  0.14 0.1  0.12   Austria(a)  0.36 0.26  0.27 
Portugal(a)  0.18 0.11  0.22   Portugal(a)  0.42 0.29  0.44 
Spain(a)  0.17 0.09  0.24   Spain(a)  0.28 0.14  0.28 
Note: (a) Country acting alone, (b) Policy enacted in all EA countries. 
Source: Barrell et al. (2009). 
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